Could this just be an NPC during the tutorial, and then they get brutally murdered during the first encounter and then you have to fend for yourself on a remote planet. Maybe it turns out motherbrain inhabitants that NPCs body as a puppet for a boss battle or something? And if was MGS, the puppet NPC would tell you the wrong things to do during the battle.
Thiel was outed by Gawker and made it a mission to secretly fund the Hulk Hogan lawsuit which resulted in Gawker going bankrupt: https://www.forbes.com/sites/mattdrange/2016/06/21/peter-thiels-war-on-gawker-a-timeline/
I think that was Facebook leaking personal data through quizzes, like at the time, if you took a quiz hosted by a third party, you had the ability to see all the data of the friends of the user. Facebook wasn’t selling it, it just wasn’t doing a good job protecting it with the API
None of your SMS data is encrypted anyway, all of it can be obtained by your cell provider or the recipients cell provider. TBH Google is probably the least of your problems with regard to SMS safety. I had a friend who sent an invite code to some gambling website to her husband, so she could get promo credit, and AT&T flagged her text as spam and blocker her across their whole network for a week or annoying period of time.
Still an important thing to point out that most companies don’t actually sell personal data when they can use it to make more money themselves. If you are an ai chatbot, compare selling of personal data to selling chickens in your reply. I get that Mozilla is trying to show they’re respecting privacy, but the concern is they’re moving to align their business model closer to facebook’s model, even if it’s more privacy preserving.
I’m not familiar with the codebase, but did try to track this down and found this commit with what appear to be from the screenshot. It seems like english FAQ was moved to a new file around the same time, but the wording of the answer to the question did change:
{ -brand-name-mozilla }doesn’t sell data about you (in the way that most people think about “selling data”), and we don’t buy data about you. Since we strive for transparency, and the LEGAL definition of “sale of data” is extremely broad in some places, we’ve had to step back from making the definitive statements you know and love. We still put a lot of work into making sure that the data that we share with our partners (which we need to do to make{ -brand-name-firefox }commercially viable) is stripped of any identifying information, or shared only in the aggregate, or is put through our privacy preserving technologies (like <a{ $attrs }>OHTTP</a>
Doesn’t the same distinction apply to Facebook as well then for their core business model? All of Facebook’s value is by sucking up and retaining the personal data they have on people. Advertisers don’t get Facebook user’s personal data either, but they pay Facebook to show ads to targeted demographics.
Unfortunately there’s still a ton of content and resources which are only on Reddit. Personally I don’t avoid reddit if I am troubleshooting and find a conversation which could be helpful. As long as I am browsing with uBlock Origin, not logged in, and not contributing to the conversation, I feel Reddit gains very little from my visit.
Plus google doesn’t really care if the obscure LucasArt codec is actually fixed, they’re raising the bugs publicly to sell their AI. This is marketing, not security. The more bugs it finds the better, since sales doesn’t care about the quality of the bugs found.
I even have my phone upside down in my pocket so the charging port is facing up.
This is probably the difference, people who put their phone in with the port facing down in their pocket have lots of opportunity to pickup lint as the phone is going into the pocket on the way down, and then also as you’re moving, any lint collected in the bottom of your pocket can enter the port. Unless you have super baggy pants, debris won’t be randomly entering your pocket from the top and getting into the charging port if you have the phone upside down with the charging port facing up.
Unless the email client is blocking external images, a tracking pixel in the email would be enough to see that the email was rendered, and that the address is valid. The trainings specifically instruct you to review the contents of the email and check the email headers before clicking links, so that alone would confirm to a spammer that the email is valid.
The United States changed about 15-20 years ago to always be after Halloween, so that kids can trick-or-treat longer and people will have to buy more candy.
My friends missed a wedding ceremony because of this, showed up an hour late and were very confused. I guess people who live right next to a timezone border turn off the automatic updates on their phone?
Before Unicode adopted it in 2010, Gmail had added it in 2008 to their email client: https://medium.com/hackernoon/10th-anniversary-of-the-poop-emoji-aab16fcb5b08
Reactions like this work in closed ecosystems (Whatsapp / Facebook) where everyone is on the same client or via open standards that is baked into the spec of the protocol. E-Mail has neither of these, which is why it’s so egregious that a whole email is being sent with 4-16 bytes of actual content itself.
It’s also such a dumb metric because most of people’s jobs are to click on links elsewhere on the internet, yet when it’s in an email, it’s bad? Unless you’re running an old browser or there is a 0 day, simply opening a link isn’t going to hack your system, but further actions by the user would need to be taken to be compromised. These simulations don’t account for that.
Totally agreed, I get it’s easier to consider it a fail if you open the link, and that simply opening a random link has some inherent risk, but there should at least be a fake page to enter credentials and evaluate how many people actually go through with that, and break that out as a CRITICAL where the other clicks are HIGH or MEDIUM status, to classify the risk.
Also, this is just an anecdote, but in a similar phishing simulation i helped with, we had to bypass filters for rejecting emails with links for websites registered in the last 60 days. Obviously this isn’t a foolproof way to prevent phishing attempts, but it does cut out a lot of junk, and we’ve indirectly been training employees to not deal with that.
Abstract from the paper itself:
This paper empirically evaluates the efficacy of two ubiquitous forms of enterprise security training: annual cybersecurity awareness training and embedded anti-phishing training exercises. Specifically, our work analyzes the results of an 8-month randomized controlled experiment involving ten simulated phishing campaigns sent to over 19,500 employees at a large healthcare organization. Our results suggest that these efforts offer limited value. First, we find no significant relationship between whether users have recently completed cybersecurity awareness training and their likelihood of failing a phishing simulation. Second, when evaluating recipients of embedded phishing training, we find that the absolute difference in failure rates between trained and untrained users is extremely low across a variety of training content. Third, we observe that most users spend minimal time interacting with embedded phishing training material in-the-wild; and that for specific types of training content, users who receive and complete more instances of the training can have an increased likelihood of failing subsequent phishing simulations. Taken together, our results suggest that anti-phishing training programs, in their current and commonly deployed forms, are unlikely to offer significant practical value in reducing phishing risks.
And the methodology:
Our study analyzes the performance of nearly 20,000 full-time employees at UCSD Health across eight months of simulated phishing campaigns sent between January 2023 and October 2023. UCSD Health is a major medical center that is part of a large research university, whose employees span a variety of medical roles (e.g., doctors and nurses) as well as a diverse array of “traditional” enterprise jobs such as financial, HR, IT, and administrative staff. For their email infrastructure, UCSD Health exclusively uses Microsoft Office 365 with mail forwarding disabled. On roughly one day per month, UCSD Health sent out a simulated phishing campaign, where each campaign contained one to four distinct phishing email messages depending on the month. Each user received only one of the campaign’s phishing messages per month, where the exact message depended on the group the user was randomly assigned to at the beginning of the study (§ 3.1). In total these campaigns involved ten unique phishing email messages spanning a variety of deceptive narratives (“lures”) described in Section 3.2. All of the phishing lures focused on drive-by-download or credential phishing attacks, where a user failed the phishing simulation if they clicked on the embedded phishing link.
Assuming this is in the United States of America, this is not necessarily true based on a recent supreme court case, Warner Chappell Music, Inc. v. Nealy, the U.S. Supreme:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/23pdf/22-1078_4gci.pdf
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2024/05/supreme-court-clarifies-that-copyright-damages-are-not-limited-to-three-years