As evidence, the lawsuit cites unnamed “courageous whistleblowers” who allege that WhatsApp and Meta employees can request to view a user’s messages through a simple process, thus bypassing the app’s end-to-end encryption. “A worker need only send a ‘task’ (i.e., request via Meta’s internal system) to a Meta engineer with an explanation that they need access to WhatsApp messages for their job,” the lawsuit claims. “The Meta engineering team will then grant access – often without any scrutiny at all – and the worker’s workstation will then have a new window or widget available that can pull up any WhatsApp user’s messages based on the user’s User ID number, which is unique to a user but identical across all Meta products.”
“Once the Meta worker has this access, they can read users’ messages by opening the widget; no separate decryption step is required,” the 51-page complaint adds. “The WhatsApp messages appear in widgets commingled with widgets containing messages from unencrypted sources. Messages appear almost as soon as they are communicated – essentially, in real-time. Moreover, access is unlimited in temporal scope, with Meta workers able to access messages from the time users first activated their accounts, including those messages users believe they have deleted.” The lawsuit does not provide any technical details to back up the rather sensational claims.


Well, no. At least not by default as you are running a compiled version of it. Someone could inject code you don’t know anything about before compilation that for example leaked your keys.
One way to be more confident no one has, would be to have predictable builds that you can recreate and then compare the file fingerprints. But I do not think that is possible, at least on android, as google holds they signature keys to apps.
Signal is also on F-Droid, so it should be verifiable
Signal has reproducible builds and here’s the instruction how to check it on Android https://github.com/signalapp/Signal-Android/blob/main/reproducible-builds/README.md