The distinction lies in competitive risk. Under independent action, if one firm cuts supply to raise prices, rivals are incentivized to increase production to steal market share, which naturally caps price hikes. Under collusion, firms agree to cut supply simultaneously, eliminating this competitive check. This creates artificial scarcity, allowing all participants to charge monopoly prices without fear of being undercut. The lawsuit argues this is especially damaging in the DRAM market, where $15–20 billion entry barriers prevent new competitors from entering to discipline prices.
You’re seeing an oligopoly in a prisoner’s dilemma. I’ll try to better explain what I thought I said at the end of my last post:
The suit alleges that because these three firms control ~95% of the market and face huge entry barriers ($20B+ for a new fab), they successfully suppress the natural incentive to compete. Instead of one firm expanding to capture the DDR4 market (which would lower prices), they allegedly coordinated to all exit that market simultaneously, creating an artificial scarcity that independent self-interest would rarely sustain.
When this prisoner’s dilemma operates “correctly”, every firm fears being the “sucker” who cuts production while others don’t. This fear often forces them to compete (produce more) rather than collude, keeping prices lower than they would be under a true monopoly.
The lawsuit argues that the market should naturally suffer from this instability, protecting consumers. Collusion removes this natural check.
The distinction lies in competitive risk. Under independent action, if one firm cuts supply to raise prices, rivals are incentivized to increase production to steal market share, which naturally caps price hikes. Under collusion, firms agree to cut supply simultaneously, eliminating this competitive check. This creates artificial scarcity, allowing all participants to charge monopoly prices without fear of being undercut. The lawsuit argues this is especially damaging in the DRAM market, where $15–20 billion entry barriers prevent new competitors from entering to discipline prices.
How so? Wouldn’t you be incentivized to also cut supply to raise prices knowing that your “competition” is in the same boat?
The logic you outlined only works if there are many, many players, not a handful.
You’re seeing an oligopoly in a prisoner’s dilemma. I’ll try to better explain what I thought I said at the end of my last post:
The suit alleges that because these three firms control ~95% of the market and face huge entry barriers ($20B+ for a new fab), they successfully suppress the natural incentive to compete. Instead of one firm expanding to capture the DDR4 market (which would lower prices), they allegedly coordinated to all exit that market simultaneously, creating an artificial scarcity that independent self-interest would rarely sustain.
When this prisoner’s dilemma operates “correctly”, every firm fears being the “sucker” who cuts production while others don’t. This fear often forces them to compete (produce more) rather than collude, keeping prices lower than they would be under a true monopoly.
The lawsuit argues that the market should naturally suffer from this instability, protecting consumers. Collusion removes this natural check.